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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relative importance of many factors in the capital structure 
decisions of publicly traded American firms from 1950 to 2003. The most reliable factors for 
explaining market leverage are: median industry leverage (+ effect on leverage), market-to-
book assets ratio (-), tangibility (+), profits (-), log of assets (+), and expected inflation (+). In 
addition, we find that dividend-paying firms tend to have lower leverage. When considering 
book leverage, somewhat similar effects are found. However, for book leverage, the impact 
of firm size, the market-to-book ratio, and the effect of inflation are not reliable. The 
empirical evidence seems reasonably consistent with some versions of the tradeoff theory of 
capital structure. 
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When corporations decide on the use of debt finance, they are reallocating some expected 
future cash flows away from equity claimants in exchange for cash up front. The factors that 
drive this decision remain elusive despite a vast theoretical literature, and despite decades of 
empirical tests. This stems in part from the fact that many of the empirical studies are aimed at 
providing support for a particular theory. The amount of evidence is large, and so it is often all 
too easy to provide some empirical support for almost any idea. This is fine for a given paper, 
but more problematic for the overall development of our understanding of capital structure 
decisions. As a result, in recent decades the literature has not had a solid empirical basis to 
distinguish the strengths and the weaknesses of the main theories. 
Which theories shall we take seriously? Naturally, opinions differ. Many theories of capital 
structure have been proposed. But only a few seem to have many advocates. Notably, most 
corporate finance textbooks point to the “tradeoff theory” in which taxation and deadweight 
bankruptcy costs are key. Myers (1984) proposed the “pecking order theory” in which there is a 
financing hierarchy of retained earnings, debt and then equity. Recently the idea that firms 
engage in “market timing” has become popular. Finally, agency theory lurks in the background 
of much theoretical discussion. Agency concerns are often lumped into the tradeoff framework 
broadly interpreted. 
Advocates of these models frequently point to empirical evidence to support their preferred 
theory. Often reference is made to the survey by Harris and Raviv (1991) or to the empirical 
study by Titman and Wessels (1988).1 These two classic papers illustrate a serious empirical 
problem. They disagree over basic facts. 
According to Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 334), the available studies “generally agree that 
leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and firm size 
and decreases with volatility, advertising expenditures, research and development expenditures, 
bankruptcy probability, profitability and uniqueness of the product.” However, Titman and 
Wessels (1988, p. 17) find that their “results do not provide support for an effect on debt ratios 
arising from non-debt tax shields, volatility, collateral value, or future growth.” Consequently, 
advocates of particular theories are offered a choice of diametrically opposing well-known 
summaries of “what we all know” from the previous literature. Clearly this is unsatisfactory, and 
this study aims to help resolve this empirical problem. 
This paper contributes to our understanding of capital structure in several ways. First, starting 
with a long list of factors from the prior literature, we examine which factors are reliably signed, 
and reliably important, for predicting leverage. Second, it is likely that patterns of corporate 
financing decisions have changed over the decades. During the 1980s, many U.S. firms took on 
extra leverage apparently due to pressure from the market for corporate control. Starting in the 
1990s, more small firms made use of publicly traded equity. It is therefore important to examine 
the changes over time. Finally, it has been argued that different theories apply to firms under 
                                                 
1 Zingales (2000) also sets out to survey the theoretical capital structure literature but notes that “10 years later, 
the survey by Harris and Raviv (1991) would not necessitate any dramatic rewriting” (p. 1623). More recently, 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) helped popularize the old market timing idea. 
different circumstances.2 To address this serious concern, the effect of conditioning on firm 
circumstances is studied. 
In testing which factors are correlated with leverage, it is necessary to define leverage. Many 
different empirical definitions have been used. Some scholars advocate book leverage, while 
others advocate market leverage. The opinions on which is a better measure of leverage differ. 
According to Myers (1977), managers focus on book leverage because debt is better supported 
by assets in place than it is by growth opportunities. Book leverage is also preferred because 
financial markets fluctuate a great deal and managers are said to believe that market leverage 
numbers are unreliable as a guide to corporate financial policy. Consistent with the academic 
perception of manager's views, in Graham and Harvey (2001), a large number of managers 
indicate that they do not rebalance their capital structure in response to equity market movements. 
The presence of adjustment costs prevent firms from rebalancing continuously.3 
Advocates of market leverage argue that the book value of equity is primarily a ‘plug number’ 
used to balance the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the balance sheet rather than a 
managerially relevant number (see, for example, Welch (2004)). Welch further objects that the 
book value of equity can even be negative (although assets cannot be). The book measure is 
backward looking. It measures what has taken place. Markets are generally assumed to be 
forward looking. Thus, there is no reason why these two measures should match (see Barclay, 
Morellec, and Smith (2006)). The literature also uses different definitions of debt. Debt can be 
                                                 
2 “There is no universal theory of capital structure, and no reason to expect one. There are useful conditional 
theories, however. … Each factor could be dominant for some firms or in some circumstances, yet unimportant 
elsewhere” (Myers, 2003, pp. 216-217). 
3 Empirical estimates of the speed of adjustment show, perhaps surprisingly, relatively little differences in the 
speed whether book value or market value debt ratios are used (Huang and Ritter (2007)). 
defined as long-term or total debt, and it can be defined to include accounts payable or all 
liabilities. 
In presenting our results, our main focus is on the ratio of total debt to market value of assets 
(TDM). However, given these differing views, we also report results for alternative definitions of 
leverage. We do find reliable empirical patterns that account for much of the variation in market 
leverage across firms using a sample of publicly traded U.S. firms from 1950-2003.4 With a 
market-based definition of leverage, we find that a set of six factors account for more than 27% 
of the variation in leverage, while the remaining factors only add a further 2%. We call this set of 
six factors “core factors” and the model that includes these factors the “core model of leverage”. 
The core factors have consistent signs and statistical significance across many alternative 
treatments of the data. The remaining factors are not nearly as consistent. The core factors for the 
market leverage are as follows. 
 Industry median leverage: Firms in industries in which the median firm has high 
leverage tend to have high leverage. 
 Tangibility: Firms that have more tangible assets tend to have higher leverage. 
 Profits: Firms that have more profits tend to have lower leverage. 
 Firm size: Firms that are large (in terms of assets) tend to have higher leverage. 
 Market-to-book assets ratio: Firms that have a high market-to-book ratio tend to have 
lower leverage. 
                                                 
4 Dynamic aspects of leverage are important and have recently been a focus of many papers. Leverage changes 
have played an important role is tests of the pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and 
Goyal (2003)). Leverage changes have also been important in tests of target adjustment. The literature commonly 
agrees that leverage exhibits mean reversion, but the speed of adjustment is sensitive to the econometric procedure 
used. See, for example, Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Welch (2004), Frank and Goyal (2004), Leary and 
Roberts (2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), Huang and Ritter (2007), and 
Tsyplakov (2008) among others. There has been much less recent attention to cross-sectional differences that are the 
focus of this paper. 
 Expected inflation: When inflation is expected to be high, firms tend to have high 
leverage. 
This set of core factors raises several important questions. (1) Are all of these effects equally 
reliable? (2) Can we replace some of the core factors with other common factors and still 
adequately control for the known facts? (3) How important are the excluded factors? (4) How 
does this set of core factors relate to the popular theories of leverage? 
Question 1. Of course, these factors are not all equally reliable. Expected inflation is likely to 
be the least reliable factor. It is the only macroeconomic factor to be included and so instead of 
having over 270,000 firm-year observations, we have just 54 annual observations for expected 
inflation. Accordingly, we cannot have nearly the same level of confidence that this factor will 
perform similarly out of sample. 
The six core factors provide a more powerful account of a market-based definition of 
leverage than of a book-based definition of leverage. If we had been focusing on a book-based 
definition of leverage, the market-to-book ratio, firm size and expected inflation would all have 
been excluded from the core model. The remaining factors, i.e., industry median leverage, 
tangibility, and profits are robust across various alternative definitions of leverage. 
Recall that market-based leverage is forward looking, while book-based leverage is backward 
looking. From this point of view, it would appear that the market-to-book, firm size, and 
expected inflation factors are reflecting effects that are forward looking. The industry median, 
tangibility and profitability are reflecting the effect of the past. 
There have been significant changes in the core model over time. The most important of 
these is the declining importance of profits. In the period before the 1980s, profits played a very 
powerful role in determining leverage. In the later period, profits – while still statistically 
significant – became less important in leverage decisions. This result provides yet more evidence 
of the fact, discussed in Frank and Goyal (2003), that during the 1980s and 1990s, equity 
markets became more willing to fund currently unprofitable firms with good growth prospects. 
When we consider firms in different circumstances, the most important fact is the degree of 
similarity among the factors. However, as should be expected, there are interesting differences to 
be found. The most noteworthy difference is between high and low market-to-book firms. 
Tangibility and firm size are more important in explaining leverage for low market-to-book firms 
than they are for high market-to-book firms. 
Question 2. Many studies in the literature have used different sets of factors. Three variations 
on the list of six factors are likely to be innocuous. First, replacing assets with sales is unlikely to 
matter, since both reflect the role of firm size. Second, replacing expected inflation with the 
nominal Treasury bill rate is unlikely to matter since they are highly correlated. Third, replacing 
tangibility with collateral is unlikely to matter. Tangibility and collateral differ in that collateral 
includes inventories while tangibility does not. Inventories usually support short-term debt. In 
addition, inventories as a fraction of total assets have declined significantly over time. 
When selecting control factors, some studies point to the four factors used by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995). Their factors are: market-to-book, profit, tangibility, and sales. These factors 
are reasonable but this list excludes the effect of expected inflation and median industry leverage. 
A natural question is how significant are the omissions of some core factors in leverage 
regressions. We show that these omissions can materially change inferences on other factors that 
are included in the model. The included minor factors sometimes become insignificant or, even 
worse, change sign when the set of core factors is changed. 
Question 3. Statistically, the excluded factors make little difference. As mentioned above, 
they add little to the explanatory power of the model and many of them have effects that are not 
reliable. On the other hand, these factors may be critical for the consideration of particular 
theories. For this reason we also report the patterns that are observed for the minor factors. 
Question 4. The current paper does not provide structural tests of capital structure theories. 
Instead, the focus is on identifying reliable patterns in the data. If a factor is known to be reliably 
related to leverage decade after decade, then a useful theory ought to be able to account for that 
fact. Often the theories make specific predictions about the signs of the coefficients that should 
be observed. We therefore consider the extent to which some aspects of the evidence pose 
problems for theory. Using this information, we offer suggestions about directions in which the 
theories might be developed so they can be more empirically relevant. 
Five of the six core factors have the sign predicted by the static tradeoff theory in which 
deadweight bankruptcy costs are traded-off against the tax saving of debt. The sign on profits is 
inconsistent with the static tradeoff theory, but is consistent with dynamic tradeoff models such 
as Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) in which firms allow their leverage to drift most of the 
time, and only adjust their leverage if it gets too far out of line.5 It is similarly consistent with 
                                                 
5 An interesting question is whether the levels of underwriting costs reported by Lee et al. (1996) and Altinkiliç 
and Hansen (2000) are sufficient to explain the observed periods of inactivity followed by rebalancing. Recent work 
by Leary and Robert (2005), Hennessy and Whited (2005), Strebulaev (2007) seems particularly promising in this 
respect. 
Tsyplakov (2008) in which, due to time-to-build, firms stock-pile retained earnings until the time 
is right to buy physical capacity. 
While the tax versus bankruptcy tradeoff is the most common version of the tradeoff theory, 
it is not the only model within the general tradeoff theory label. Tradeoff theory also includes 
models such as Stulz (1990) and Morellec (2004) in which agency costs play a crucial role. In 
Stulz (1990), for example, financing policies matter because they influence the resources under 
manager's control. This reduces the costs of over- and under-investment. We suspect that agency 
costs of managerial discretion and stockholder-bondholder conflicts are likely quite important 
relative to taxes. Our findings reproduce the well-known fact that tax effects are relatively hard 
to clearly identify in the data. Even if taxes are not the full story, they matter at least to some 
extent (see Graham (2003)). In addition, Hennessy and Whited (2005) show that due to 
transactions costs, it is possible that tax effects will be hard to identify empirically even when 
they are an element of the firm's problem. For these reasons, we think that distinguishing the 
relative importance of the agency costs versus the tax-bankruptcy costs tradeoffs deserves further 
work. 
The pecking order theory is often used to explain financing decisions of firms. A significant 
merit of the pecking order theory is that it predicts the effect of profits correctly (Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999)). However, as shown by Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003), 
the theory has other problems.6 In its current form, the pecking order theory is not helpful in 
organizing many of the features we see in the way firms finance themselves. 
                                                 
6 Furthermore, Frank and Goyal (2003) show that the pecking order theory works much better in the 1970s and 
the 1980s and it performed progressively worse in the 1990s. Huang and Ritter (2007) show that the poor 
performance of the pecking order in the more recent period coincided with a decline in the equity risk premium. 
The market timing theory makes correct predictions for the market-to-book assets ratio and 
the effect of expected inflation. However, by itself market timing does not make any predictions 
for many of the patterns in the data that are accounted for by the tradeoff theory. The market 
timing theory needs considerable theoretical development to explain all of empirical regularities 
we observe in the data. 
There is no unified model of leverage currently available that can directly account for the six 
reliable factors. However, the main elements that might be used to create such a theory are 
present in the literature already. The theory will have to be explicitly inter-temporal to reflect the 
effects of market-to-book and expected inflation. To reflect profits, the theory is likely to have a 
friction such as significant fixed costs of adjustment or time-to-build. To capture the role of 
tangibility, it will need to have some role for repossession of assets by the suppliers of debt. The 
theory might well have a role for financial constraints of some type to explain the effect of firm 
size. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We provide a brief overview of the main 
prediction of leading capital structure theories in Section I. The data are described in Section II. 
The factor selection process and results are presented in Section III. This leads to the core model 
of leverage that is presented in Section IV. The conclusions are presented in Section V. 
I. Capital structure theories and their predictions 
This section provides a brief review of the prominent theories of capital structure followed by 
a summary of predictions on how the theories relate to observable leverage factors. A more 
detailed review of the capital structure literature is provided by Frank and Goyal (2008). 
A. Capital structure theories 
1. Tradeoff theory 
According to the tradeoff theory, capital structure is determined by a tradeoff between the 
benefits of debt and the costs of debt. The benefits and costs can be obtained in a variety of ways. 
The “tax-bankruptcy tradeoff” perspective is that firms balance the tax benefits of debt against 
the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. The “agency” perspective is that debt disciplines managers 
and mitigates agency problems of free cash flow since debt must be repaid to avoid bankruptcy 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986)). Although debt mitigates shareholder-manager 
conflicts, it exacerbates shareholder-debtholder conflicts (Stulz (1990)). 
Product and factor market interactions suggest that in some firms, efficiency requires a firm's 
stakeholders to make significant firm-specific investments. Capital structures that make these 
firm-specific investments insecure will generate few such investments. Theory suggests that 
capital structure could either enhance or impede productive interactions among the stakeholders. 
Titman (1984) argues that firms making unique products will lose customers if they appear likely 
to fail. Maksimovic and Titman (1991) consider how leverage affects a firm's incentives to offer 
a high quality product. Jaggia and Thakor (1994) and Hart and Moore (1994) consider the 
importance of managerial investments in human capital. These perspectives differ from the tax-
bankruptcy tradeoff in that the costs of debt are from disruption to normal business operations 
and thus do not depend on the arguably small direct costs of bankruptcy. In other words, the 
product and factor market interaction based tradeoff theories can be viewed as trading off the 
advantages of debt with liquidation costs rather than bankruptcy costs. 
2. Pecking order theory 
While the pecking order theory has long roots in the descriptive literature, it was clearly 
articulated by Myers (1984). Consider three sources of funds available to firms – retained 
earnings, debt, and equity. Equity has serious adverse selection, debt has only minor adverse 
selection, and retained earnings avoid the problem. From the point of view of an outside investor, 
equity is strictly riskier than debt. Rational investors will thus revalue a firm's securities when it 
announces a security issue. For all but the lowest quality firm, the drop in valuation of equity 
makes equity look undervalued, conditional on issuing equity. From the perspective of those 
inside the firm, retained earnings are a better source of funds than outside financing. Retained 
earnings are thus used when possible. If retained earnings are inadequate, debt financing will be 
used. Equity is used only as a last resort. This is a theory of leverage in which there is no notion 
of an optimal leverage ratio. Although the pecking order theory is almost always framed in terms 
of asymmetric information, it can also be generated from tax, agency or behavioral 
considerations.7 
3. Market timing theory 
Market timing, a relatively old idea (see Myers (1984)), is having a renewed surge of 
popularity in the academic literature. In surveys, such as those by Graham and Harvey (2001), 
managers continue to offer at least some support for the idea. Consistent with market timing 
behavior, firms tend to issue equity following a stock price run-up. In addition, studies that 
analyze long-run stock returns following corporate financing events find evidence consistent 
                                                 
7 See, Frank and Goyal (2008) for a discussion of how tax and agency considerations can lead to a hierarchy of 
financing. Heaton (2002) generates the pecking order using a simple model of optimistic managers. 
with market timing.8 Lucas and McDonald (1990) analyze a dynamic adverse selection model 
that combines elements of the pecking order with the market timing idea, which can explain pre-
issue runups but not post-issue underperformance. Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that capital 
structure is best understood as the cumulative effect of past attempts to time the market. 
The basic idea is that managers look at current conditions in both debt and equity markets. If 
they need financing, they use whichever market currently looks more favorable. If neither market 
looks favorable, they may defer issuances. Alternatively, if current conditions look unusually 
favorable, funds may be raised even if the firm has no need for funds currently. 
While this idea seems plausible, it has nothing to say about most of the factors traditionally 
considered in studies of corporate leverage. However, it does suggest that stock returns and debt 
market conditions will play an important role in capital structure decisions. 
B. Predictions 
From the existing literature, we extract a long list of factors claimed to have some influence 
on corporate leverage. This list includes measures of profitability, size, growth, industry, nature 
of assets, taxation, risk, supply-side constraints, stock market conditions, debt market conditions, 
and macroeconomic conditions. 9  Appendix A provides a description of these factors. The 
                                                 
8 The evidence that equity issuers have low subsequent abnormal returns shows up in a number of studies (see, 
for example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Jegadeesh (2000)). Furthermore, Baker and Wurgler (2000) find low 
returns on the stock market following heavy aggregate stock issuance. 
9 We do not include ‘derived’ factors included in several previous papers. Thus, we do not consider the Titman 
and Wessels (1988) version of non-debt tax shields, the Graham (1996) version of trichotomous tax variable, the Z-
score factor, and the Korajczyk and Levy (2003) measure of financial constraints. These factors are constructed 
from factors that are already in our list and are consequently highly correlated with the factors that we consider. In 
general, we do not consider alternative choices which are highly correlated with the factors we include in the study. 
For example, we measure firm size using log of assets. An alternative is log of sales. The two are highly correlated 
(ρ=0.92). Similarly, high correlations exist between profitability and a loss-making indicator variable (ρ=-0.63), 
change in assets and change in sales (ρ=0.51), tangibility and collateral value (ρ=0.75), term spread and quality 
spread (ρ=-0.82), T-Bill rate and expected inflation (ρ=0.76), and between purchasing manager's sentiment index 
and macro-growth (ρ=0.78). 
theories are not developed in terms of standard accounting definitions. To test the theories, it is 
therefore necessary to make judgments about the connection between the observable data and 
theory. While many of these judgments seem uncontroversial, there is room for significant 
disagreement in some cases. 
1. Leverage and profitability 
Profitable firms face lower expected costs of financial distress and find interest tax shields 
more valuable. Thus, the tax and the bankruptcy costs perspective predicts that profitable firms 
use more debt. In addition, the agency costs perspective predicts that the discipline provided by 
debt is more valuable for profitable firms as these firms are likely to have severe free cash flow 
problems (Jensen (1986)). 
Recent papers, however, suggest that the tradeoff theory predictions on profitability are more 
complex than those based on static models (see Strebulaev (2007)). In a dynamic trade-off model, 
leverage can appear to be negatively related to profitability in the data due to various frictions. 
Empirically, the response has been to argue that leverage and profitability are negatively related 
because firms passively accumulate profits (see Kayhan and Titman (2007)).10 
The pecking order theory argues that firms prefer internal finance over external funds. If 
investments and dividends are fixed, then more profitable firms will become less levered over 
time. 
Measure: Profitability 
                                                 
10 However, Chen and Zhao (2005) conclude that neither transaction costs nor taxes can properly explain the 
negative relation between leverage and profitability. 
2. Leverage and firm size 
Large, more diversified, firms face lower default risk. In addition, older firms with better 
reputations in debt markets face lower debt-related agency costs. Thus, the tradeoff theory 
predicts larger, more mature firms to have relatively more debt. 
The pecking order theory is usually interpreted as predicting an inverse relation between 
leverage and firm size and between leverage and firm age. Large firms are better known as they 
have been around longer. In addition, older firms have had an opportunity to retain earnings. 
Measures: (i) Log of assets, and (ii) Mature firms 
3. Leverage and growth 
Growth increases costs of financial distress, reduces free cash flow problems, and 
exacerbates debt-related agency problems.11 Growing firms place a greater value on stakeholder 
co-investment. Thus, the tradeoff theory predicts that growth reduces leverage. 
By contrast, the pecking order theory implies that firms with more investments - holding 
profitability fixed - should accumulate more debt over time. Thus, growth opportunities and 
leverage are positively related under the pecking order theory. 
The market-to-book asset ratio is the most commonly used proxy for growth opportunities. 
Adam and Goyal (2008) show that it is also the most reliable. A higher market-to-book ratio, 
however, may also be influenced by stock mispricing. If market timing drives capital structure 
decisions, a higher market-to-book ratio should reduce leverage as firms exploit equity 
                                                 
11 Growth could also be a manifestation of free cash flow, which can be used by managers to build empires. 
mispricing through equity issuances. Furthermore, a mechanical negative relation may exist 
between a market-based definition of leverage and the market-to-book-assets ratio. 
Capital expenditures and the change in log assets, which are also proxies for growth, 
represent outflows. They directly increase the financing deficit as discussed in Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999). These variables should therefore be positively related to debt under the 
pecking order theory. 
Measures: (i) the market to book ratio, (ii) Change in log assets, and (iii) Capital expenditure to 
assets ratio 
4. Leverage and industry conditions 
It is well known that leverage ratios exhibit significant variation across industries. Textbooks 
in corporate finance such as Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe (2008) routinely point to inter-industry 
differences in debt ratios. More formal tests are presented in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 
(2008). Industry differences in leverage ratios have several possible meanings. One interpretation 
is that managers perhaps use industry median leverage as a benchmark as they contemplate their 
own firm's leverage. Thus, industry median leverage is often used as a proxy for target capital 
structure (see, for example, Gilson (1997), Hull (1999), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), 
Faccio and Masulis (2005), and Flannery and Rangan (2006)). Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 
(2001) provide evidence consistent with firms actively adjusting their debt ratios towards the 
industry average. 
Another interpretation is that industry effects reflect a set of correlated, but otherwise omitted 
factors.12 Firms in an industry face common forces that affect their financing decisions. These 
could reflect product market interactions or the nature of competition.13 These could also reflect 
industry heterogeneity in the types of assets, business risk, technology, or regulation. Industry 
factors do not have a unique interpretation. 
We consider two industry variables – industry median growth and industry median leverage. 
Tradeoff theory predicts that higher industry median growth should result in less debt, while 
higher industry median leverage should result in more debt. Finally, we consider if firms are 
regulated. Regulated firms have stable cash flows and lower expected costs of financial distress. 
Thus, regulated firms should have more debt. But, at the same time, managers have less 
discretion in regulated firms, which reduces the severity of shareholders-managers conflicts and 
makes debt less desirable from a control perspective. Tradeoff theory makes an ambiguous 
prediction on the effect of regulation on leverage. 
Under a pure pecking order perspective, the industry should only matter to the extent that it 
serves as a proxy for the firm's financing deficit - a rather indirect link. Under the market timing 
theory, the industry should matter only if valuations are correlated across firms in an industry. 
Measures: (i) Median industry leverage, (ii) Median industry growth, and (iii) Regulated dummy 
                                                 
12 Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004) follow this interpretation and include industry leverage to 
control for omitted factors. It is also possible to give industry a more structural interpretation. Almazan and Molina 
(2005) and Mackay and Phillips (2005) interpret industry in terms of relatively specialized industry equilibrium 
models. 
13 Brander and Lewis (1986) and Chevalier (1995). 
5. Leverage and nature of assets 
Tangible assets, such as property, plant, and equipment are easier for outsiders to value than 
intangibles such as the value of goodwill from an acquisition – this lowers expected distress 
costs. In addition, tangibility makes it difficult for shareholders to substitute high-risk assets for 
low-risk ones. The lower expected costs of distress and fewer debt-related agency problems 
predict a positive relation between tangibility and leverage. An analogous prediction is that firms 
making large discretionary expenditures such as SG&A expenses and R&D expenses have more 
intangible assets and consequently less debt. 
Stakeholder co-investment theory suggests that firms producing unique products (such as 
durable goods) should have less debt in their capital structure (Titman (1984)). Firms in unique 
industries have more specialized labor, which results in higher financial distress costs and 
consequently less debt. To protect unique assets that result from large expenditures on SG&A 
and R&D, these firms will have less debt. 
The pecking order theory makes opposite predictions. Low information asymmetry 
associated with tangible assets makes equity issuances less costly. Thus, leverage ratios should 
be lower for firms with higher tangibility. However, if adverse selection is about assets in place, 
tangibility increases adverse selection and results in higher debt. This ambiguity under the 
pecking order theory stems from the fact that tangibility can be viewed as a proxy for different 
economic forces. Furthermore, R&D expenditures increase the financing deficit. R&D 
expenditures are particularly prone to adverse selection problems and affect debt positively under 
the pecking order theory. 
Measures: (i) Tangibility, (ii) R&D expense/sales, (iii) Uniqueness dummy, and (iv) selling, 
general and administrative expense/sales ratio. 
6. Leverage and taxes 
High tax rates increase the interest tax benefits of debt. The tradeoff theory predicts that to 
take advantage of higher interest tax shields, firms will issue more debt when tax rates are higher. 
Deangelo and Masulis (1980) show that non-debt tax shields are a substitute for the tax benefits 
of debt financing. Non-debt tax shield proxies i.e. net operating loss carryforwards, depreciation 
expense, and investment tax credits – should be negatively related to leverage. 
Measures: (i) Top tax rate, (ii) NOL carry forwards/assets, (iii) Depreciation/assets, and (iv) 
Investment tax credit/assets 
7. Leverage and risk 
Firms with more volatile cash flows face higher expected costs of financial distress and 
should use less debt. More volatile cash flows reduce the probability that tax shields will be fully 
utilized. Risk is detrimental for stakeholder co-investment. Thus higher risk should result in less 
debt under the tradeoff theory. 
We might expect firms with volatile stocks to be those about which beliefs are quite volatile. 
It seems plausible that such firms suffer more from adverse selection. If so, then the pecking 
order theory would predict that riskier firms have higher leverage. Also, firms with volatile cash 
flows might need to periodically access the external capital markets. 
Measure: Variance of stock returns 
8. Leverage and supply-side factors 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) argue that supply-side factors are important in explaining the 
variation in capital structure. When firms have restricted access to debt markets, all else equal, 
financing takes place through equity markets. Less debt is issued because of restricted debt 
market access. The proxy they use for access to debt markets is whether the firm has rated debt. 
Firms with a debt rating are expected to have more debt, ceteris paribus. 
From a pecking order perspective, however, possessing a credit rating involves a process of 
information revelation by the rating agency. Thus, firms with higher ratings have less of an 
adverse selection problem. Accordingly, firms with such ratings should use less debt and more 
equity. But this is ambiguous, since less adverse selection risk increases the frequency with 
which the external capital market is accessed, which would result in more debt. 
Measures: Debt rating dummy 
9. Leverage and stock market conditions 
Welch (2004) argues that firms do not re-balance capital structure changes caused by stock 
price shocks and therefore stock returns are “considerably more important in explaining debt-
equity ratios than all previously identified proxies together.”' Market timing theories make 
similar predictions but the effects come from managers actively timing equity markets to take 
advantage of mispricing. Time-varying adverse selection could also result in a negative relation 
between stock prices and leverage. Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) show that at the aggregate 
level, seasoned equity issues are pro-cyclical while debt issues are counter-cyclical. Korajczyk, 
Lucas, and McDonald (1990), Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991), and many other authors show that 
firms issue equity following price run-ups. In summary, the effect of stock prices on leverage 
could reflect (i) growth (as discussed previously), (ii) changes in the relative prices of asset 
classes (reflecting changes in aggregate conditions), (iii) market timing (reflecting changes in 
firm-specific conditions), and (iv) changes in adverse selection costs. The prediction that strong 
market performance results in a reduction in market leverage could be derived from any of the 
leading capital structure theories. Static tradeoff models would predict that low market debt 
ratios ought to encourage a company to issue debt in an attempt to move towards the optimum, 
which would have the effect of raising book debt ratios following high stock returns. The market 
timing theory, on the other hand, makes the contrary prediction that book debt ratios should fall 
following high stock returns as firms issue equity. 
Measures: (i) Cumulative raw returns, and (ii) Cumulative market returns 
10. Leverage and debt market conditions 
According to Taggart (1985), the real value of tax deductions on debt is higher when 
inflation is expected to be high. Thus, the tradeoff theory predicts leverage to be positively 
related to expected inflation. Market timing in debt markets also results in a positive relation 
between expected inflation and leverage if managers issue debt when expected inflation is high 
relative to current interest rates.14 Barry et al. (2008) find that firms issue more debt when current 
interest rates are low relative to historical levels. 
                                                 
14 But see Ritter and Warr (2002) for a discussion of how inflation can induce valuation errors in equity markets 
resulting in undervaluation of equity when inflation is high. 
The term spread is considered a credible signal of economic performance and expected 
growth opportunities. If a higher term spread implies higher growth, then term spread should 
negatively affect leverage. 
Measures: Expected inflation rates, Term spread 
11. Leverage and macroeconomic conditions 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) show that subsequent to recessions induced by monetary 
contractions, aggregate net debt issues increase for large firms but remain stable for small firms. 
During expansions, stock prices go up, expected bankruptcy costs go down, taxable income goes 
up, and cash increases. Thus, firms borrow more during expansions. Collateral values are likely 
to be pro-cyclical too. If firms borrow against collateral, leverage should again be pro-cyclical. 
However, agency problems are likely to be more severe during downturns as manager's 
wealth is reduced relative to that of shareholders. If debt aligns managers incentives with those 
of shareholders, leverage should be counter-cyclical. 
If pecking order theory holds, leverage should decline during expansions since internal funds 
increase during expansions, all else equal. If corporate profits have shown an increase in the 
recent past, agency problems between shareholders and managers are less severe. Consequently 
firms should issue less debt. 
Measures: (i) Growth in profit after tax, and (ii) Growth in GDP. 
2.  Data Description 
The sample consists of U.S. firms on Compustat for the period from 1950 to 2003. The data 
are annual and are converted to 1992 dollars using the GDP deflator. The stock return data are 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The macroeconomic data are 
from various public databases. These sources are described in Appendix A. Financial firms and 
firms involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB) are excluded. Also excluded are 
firms with missing book value of assets. The ratios used in the analysis are winsorized at the 
0.50% level in both tails of the distribution. This serves to replace outliers and the most 
extremely misrecorded data.15  
A. Defining leverage 
Several alternative definitions of leverage have been used in the literature. Most studies 
consider some form of a debt ratio. These differ according to whether book measures or market 
values are used. They also differ in whether total debt or only long term debt is considered. One 
can also consider the interest coverage ratio as a measure of leverage (see Welch (2004)).16 
Finally, firms have many kinds of assets and liabilities and a range of more detailed adjustments 
can be made. 
                                                 
15 Prior to trimming, several balance sheet and cash flow statement items are recoded as zero if they were 
reported missing or combined with other data items in Compustat. The data are often coded as missing when a firm 
does not report a particular item or combines it with other data items. Table 8 of Frank and Goyal (2003) identifies 
variables coded as zero when reported missing or combined with other items. Winsorizing is the procedure of 
replacing extreme values with the value of the observations at the cutoffs. Only variables constructed as ratios are 
winsorized. 
16 The interest coverage ratio is normally defined as operating income before depreciation divided by interest 
expense. A high interest coverage ratio means less leverage since earnings are large relative to debt payments. We 
find that the interest coverage ratio has a highly skewed distribution and it did poorly in most of the tests we 
examined. We do not report these results. A drawback to interest coverage is that corporate earnings are reportedly 
smoothed by managers who may attempt to portray a positive picture of health while it remains feasible to do so. 
Periodically, they take a “big bath” and may even exaggerate the losses. This may help to explain why the measure 
performs so poorly. 
In the empirical work we study four alternative definitions of leverage: (a) the ratio of total 
debt to market value of assets (TDM), (b) the ratio of total debt to book value of assets (TDA), (c) 
the ratio of long term debt to market value of assets (LDM), and (d) the ratio of long-term debt to 
book value of assets (LDA).17 Most studies focus on a single measure of leverage. 
We take TDM to be the main focus. In the literature it is common to find claims that the 
crucial results are robust to alternative leverage definitions. Having reviewed many such 
robustness claims, we expected the results to be largely robust to the choice among the four 
measures. In most regards, this is reassuring. But the robustness of many results to large 
differences between alternative measures is sometimes troublesome. Cross-sectional tests may be 
more robust to the measure used than time-series tests if macro variation can be netted out. For 
example, the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity soared between 
1974-1982 and 1999-2000 for the median firm. 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table I provides descriptive statistics. The median leverage is below the mean leverage. 
There is a large cross-sectional difference so that the 10th percentile of TDM is 0 while the 90th 
percentile is 0.67. Several factors have mean values that diverge sharply from the medians. 
To explore changes in U.S. corporate balance sheets and cash flow statements over time, 
median balance sheets normalized by total assets for U.S. firms from 1950-2003 are presented in 
Appendix Table I and median corporate cash flow statements normalized by end-of-year total 
assets are presented in Appendix Table II. These tables reveal significant time-series variation in 
                                                 
17 Beyond the four measures we consider, many other leverage definitions can be considered. Some scholars 
regard corporate cash holdings as negative debt and hence subtract cash from the debt measure. Similarly, 
corrections can also be made for a range of other assets and liabilities such as deferred taxes, accounts payable, 
pension liabilities, and others. It is important to understand that we have not carried out a full comparison of all 
treatments of all candidate leverage definitions. 
the structure of balance sheets and cash flow statements of U.S. firms.18 Cash levels fell until the 
1970s and then built back up. Inventories declined by almost half while net property, plant and 
equipment had a more modest decline. Intangibles have become increasingly important in recent 
periods. Current liabilities, especially ‘current liabilities-other’, have also increased. This 
category has risen from being trivial to accounting for about 8% of the average firm's liabilities. 
Long-term debt rose early in the period but has been fairly stable over the period 1970-2003. The 
net effect of the various changes is that total liabilities rose from about 35% of assets to more 
than 53% of assets while common book equity had a correspondingly large decline. 
The changes to the cash flows are also fairly remarkable. Both sales and the cost of goods as 
a fraction of assets fell dramatically. The selling, general and administrative expenses more than 
doubled over the period. As a result, the median firm has negative pre-tax income by the end of 
the period. Increasingly, it seems that public firms include currently unprofitable firms with 
expectations of future profitability, a pattern also noted by Fama and French (2001) and  
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004). We also find that corporate income taxes have 
declined over time. This is not surprising since the statutory tax rates have dropped, and the 
average includes more unprofitable firms. The median firm both issues and reduces a significant 
amount of debt each year. 
III. Empirical evidence on factor selection 
We begin by reporting the correlations between the factors and each of the leverage measures 
in Table II. Beneath each correlation, the pluses and minuses indicate the fraction of the time the 
correlation was of a particular sign and statistically significant at the 1% level. The sample 
                                                 
18 Some of the variation could be attributed to the exclusion of most small firms from the Compustat universe in 
the 1960s and, especially, the 1950s. 
period from 1950 to 2003 is divided into six periods - the five decades and the last period 
consisting of the period 2000-2003. A single + means that the correlation was positive and 
significant in at least 2 out of 6 periods. A ++ means that the correlation was positive and 
significant in 4 out of 6 periods. A +++ means that the correlation was positive and significant in 
every period. The -, --, and ---, are analogously defined for the negative and significant cases. A  
-+ indicates that the correlations are negative and significant for at least two out of six periods 
and positive and significant for at least another two decades. A --+ indicates that the correlations 
are negative and significant in four periods and positive and significant for the other two periods. 
Similarly, a ++- indicates that the correlations are positive and significant for four periods and 
negative and significant for the other two periods. 
In every period, positive and significant correlations with leverage (TDM) are found for: log 
of assets, median industry leverage, the dummy for being regulated, and tangibility. Similarly 
powerful negative correlations are found for: the market to book ratio, research and development 
expenses, uniqueness, selling general and administration expenses, the variance of stock returns, 
cumulative stock returns, and term spread. With some exceptions, the factors identified here 
exhibit similar correlations with the alternative leverage definitions. 
Unconditional correlations are interesting, but more important are the effects of a factor when 
other factors are also present in the analysis. Linear regressions are used to study the effects of 
the factors. Let Li,t denote the leverage of firm i on date t. The set of factors observed at firm i at 
date t-1 is denoted Fi,t-1, The constant α and the vector β are the parameters to be estimated. The 
factors are lagged one year so that they are in the information set. To remove the effects of 
clustering on the estimated standard errors, we use t-statistics corrected for clustering at both the 
firm and the year level in our tests, as suggested by Petersen (2008).19 The basic model is: 
ܮ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧.                        (1) 
We have a long list of factors. In the interest of parsimony, it is desirable to remove 
inessential factors. Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2001) describe many methods that can be 
used to decide which factors to keep and which to drop. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are the two most commonly used model selection 
criteria and we have tried both.20 Let P be the number of parameters and let N be the number of 
observations in a fitted model. The Bayesian Information Criterion is defined as follows, 
ܤܫܥ ൌ െ2 ൈ log݈݈݄݅݇݁݅݋݋݀ ൅ ܲ ൈ logሺܰሻ.                         (2) 
The Akaike Information criterion is measured similarly, but with the number 2 replacing 
log(N) in the definition. Both BIC and AIC have a sensible structure. In each case, smaller is 
better. As the log-likelihood increases, both measures fall. As the number of parameters 
increases, both measures increase. As the number of observations increases, so does the BIC. 
BIC is asymptotically consistent. In other words, suppose that you have a family of possible 
models that includes the true model. Then as the sample size grows to infinity, the probability 
that the BIC will pick the true model approaches one. In small samples it is not clear whether 
AIC or BIC is better. Since log (N)>2, the BIC tends to select a more parsimonious model. In our 
                                                 
19 We thank Petersen for the Stata ado file for two-dimensional clustering. This file can be obtained from:  
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm 
20 An alternative would be to examine the underlying correlations among factors in a principal components (or 
factors analysis) framework as in Titman and Wessels (1988). These methods have both strengths and weaknesses 
relative to regression analysis. Although we have carried out such tests, we prefer the regressions approach since the 
regression coefficients are more familiar and easier to interpret. The basic patterns in the data show up rather 
similarly under either approach. 
analysis, they routinely produce the same answers. Thus, we only report the BIC. For a useful 
discussion of the relative merits of many approaches to model selection, including both the AIC 
and BIC, see Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2001). 
Robustness of conclusions is extremely important. For this reason, in addition to overall 
results, we systematically consider the results for sub-samples. Reliably important results should 
be robust across sub-samples. We therefore generate 10 random sub-samples of the data and 
repeat the analysis on each of these groups. We also consider annual cross-sections. 
Table III presents the results of this selection process. Columns (1) to (5) illustrate the 
method that generates the minimum BIC specification for the overall sample. To understand 
these columns, start at the bottom of the table and estimate Equation (1) with all the factors. 
Report the adjusted R2 in column (4) and the BIC in column (5). Then remove the factor with the 
lowest t-statistic (in this case, it is the cumulative market return or CrspRet). Report the 
coefficient estimate and the t-stat in columns (1) and (2) for the one-variable regression using 
this variable. Reestimate a regression of leverage on cumulative market return and report the R2 
from this regression in column (3). Next, recalculate all statistics on the reduced sample that 
includes all factors except the cumulative market return. This improves the model slightly as the 
BIC drops from -28,507 to -28,519. Next, remove the factor with the lowest t-statistic and 
recalculate. This time it is the top tax-rate (TaxRate). This process continues removing one factor 
at a time until at the top of the table only a single factor remains – the median industry 
leverage.21 
                                                 
21 One concern with the industry median leverage variable is the possibility that some industries may have very 
few firms. This may bias the coefficient estimates. We examine this possibility in two ways. First, in unreported 
tests, we re-define industry at the 3-digit level and estimate the factor selection exercise. This yielded coefficient 
estimates which are virtually identical to those reported in Table III. Second we also tried excluding industries 
In columns (6) and (7), we randomly partition the data into 10 equal groups. The exercise to 
identify the minimum BIC specification is repeated on each group separately. Under the heading 
“Group Positive %” are listed the percentage of groups for which the given factor was included 
in the minimum BIC specification and had the indicated sign. Similarly, “Group Negative %” 
lists the percentage of groups for which the given factor was included in the minimum BIC 
specification and had the indicated sign. In columns (8) and (9), we repeat the minimum BIC 
selection process for each year of data run separately. Since the macro factors have only a single 
observation in each year, they are excluded from the year-specific tests. 
The selection of core factors is based on how often a factor is included in the minimum BIC 
specification in repeated runs of the sample. To be considered, as a rule of thumb, we require a 
factor to be included in at least 50% of the minimum BIC specifications. The core factors that 
result from this process include (i) Industry median leverage, (2) Tangibility, (3) Market-to-book 
assets ratio, (4) Profitability, (5) Log of assets, and (6) Expected inflation.22 These six factors 
account for about 29% of the variation in the data. We have also examined the performance of 
the variables one at a time to ensure that major variables are not being excluded from the final 
model due to a quirk of path dependence in the selection process. We find no evidence of a path-
dependence problem. 
                                                                                                                                                             
which have fewer than four firms. This resulted in exclusion of roughly 1/10th of 1% of our sample. Again, the 
results didn't change materially. 
22 Appendix Table III presents results from the core model selection exercise when industry variables are 
excluded from the analysis. The results show that the remaining five core factors continue to be included. In addition, 
three other factors appear important. These are (a) indicator variable for regulated firms (b) selling general and 
administrative expenses, and (c) macroeconomic growth. The result that industry median leverage replaces regulated 
firm dummy is consistent with the survey findings of Graham and Harvey (2001) in which managers of regulated 
firms report that they consider industry debt ratios as important in determining their own firm leverage. Bradley, 
Jarrell, and Kim (1984) also find that a large part of the cross-industry variation in leverage can be explained by 
regulated firms. It is not clear what industry effects are picked up by SG&A expense-to-sales ratio and 
macroeconomic growth. 
Much of the focus so far has been on a market-based definition of leverage (TDM). As 
indicated earlier, this definition is frequently used in the literature, but a range of alternative 
definitions have been used in other studies. The six main factors are fairly, but not perfectly, 
robust. In unreported results, we find that for LDM, the robust factors would be industry median 
leverage, tangibility, profitability, log of assets and the selling, general and administrative 
expenses-to-sales ratio. If we consider TDA, the list includes industry median leverage, 
tangibility, profitability, and net operating loss carry-forwards. If we consider LDA, the list 
includes industry median leverage, tangibility, assets, profitability, and stock return variance. 
Overall, we can conclude that industry median leverage, tangibility, and profitability appear as 
robust factors in various definitions of leverage. 
We are not aware of any theory that satisfactorily accounts for the differences that are 
observed between those factors that influence the alternative definitions of leverage. It is possible 
that the market-to-book assets ratio appears as a robust factor in TDM because the effect of the 
market-to-book ratio may be operating through an effect on the value of equity more than 
through the effect on the value of debt. There is a mechanical negative relation when market 
leverage is used, but not when book leverage is used. Inflation may similarly be affecting stock 
prices, thus affecting market leverage ratios more than the book leverage ratios. Ritter and Warr 
(2002) argue that investors misinterpret the effects of inflation, which results in inflation-induced 
valuation errors in equity markets. 
A. Financially constrained versus unconstrained firms 
Myers (2003) has argued that “the theories are conditional, not general”. They work better in 
some conditions than in others. The recent literature has focused on financial constraints as 
having a significant effect on how firms finance themselves (see, for example, Lemmon and 
Zender (2004)). We therefore examine if the factors affect leverage differently for firms that are 
relatively more financially constrained. To classify firms into those that are constrained and 
those that are not, we rely on dividend paying status, firm size, and the market-to-book assets 
ratio. Firms that pay dividends, those that are larger and those with low growth opportunities 
should find it relatively easy to raise external financing. Table IV presents results for sub-
samples of firms classified based on these three criteria. For each sub-sample, we repeat the 
Table III exercise and then report how often the factor is included for that class of firms in 
annual cross-sections. For simplicity we use a 50% cutoff rule of thumb for inclusion. 
Table IV shows that none of the excluded factors should be added back to the set of six core 
factors. On the other hand, some of the six included factors do not perform as well for certain 
types of firms. The most important point about Table IV is the remarkable similarity of effects 
across the classes of firms. Clearly, there are some differences. However, the basic patterns are 
very similar for different types of firms. It seems that financing constraints at least as measured 
in this manner do not have a big effect on our interpretation of the evidence. 
IV. Parameter estimates for the core leverage model 
The analysis in Section III has provided a set of factors that are reliably important for 
leverage. 23  The next task is to estimate Equation (1) using the factors. Table V provides 
                                                 
23 In the working paper version of this paper we show that the dividend paying dummy works empirically. 
Whether to include that factor or not is an issue on which we have found that different scholars have different 
opinions. For those wishing to see the versions of the tables that include the dividend paying dummy factor, see 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=567650. The coefficient estimates for the dividend dummy are also reported in column (9) 
of Table V. 
parameter estimates from the core model along with t-statistics computed using standard errors 
corrected for clustering both by firm and by year.24 
In column (1) of Table V, an overall regression model is reported that makes use of the 
available data for “All Years”. In columns (2) to (7) of Table V, estimates are presented on a 
decade-by-decade basis and for the four years in the 2000-2003 period. Over the decades there is 
a worsening in the ability of the set of factors to explain leverage. In the 1950s, these factors 
account for 42% of the variation in leverage. In the early 2000, they account for only about 24% 
of the variation.25 
The impact of profits declines sharply. Panel A of Table V reports that, in the 1950s, the 
estimated coefficient on profitability is -0.54, while in the early 2000s, it has declined to -0.05. 
This is a truly remarkable decline in the importance of profits. At the same time, the effects of 
firm size and dividend paying status have both increased in economic importance. 
A. Adjusting for missing data 
We have so far followed standard practice in treating missing data.26 This means we have left 
out the records of firms for which necessary data items are not available. Depending on what 
                                                 
24 Using panel regressions with either fixed effects or random effects leads to the same conclusions. This means 
that the factors help us to understand both the differences between firms as well as the differences for a given firm 
across time. 
25 By way of comparison Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest a basic model with 4 factors: tangibility, sales, 
market-to-book assets ratio, and profits. Their model has often been used as benchmark model (e.g., Frank and 
Goyal (2003)). Their four factor model does not provide as satisfactory an account of the data as these six factors. 
Estimates of that model account for 17.5% of the variation in the data. The biggest single missing factor is the 
industry effect. 
26  In fact, we have gone further by recoding certain missing values to zero where it can be reasonably 
ascertained that the values are close to zero based on standard accounting identities. We have also recoded missing 
R&D expenses to zero. Huang and Ritter (2007) point out that a majority of firms with missing R&D are firms in 
industries where R&D expenditures are likely to be zero (for e.g., clothing retailers). Dropping these observations 
systematically removes many firms with non-random characteristics. These replacements still leave many instances 
where a variable can not (and should not) be recoded to zero. 
determines which data are missing and which data are reported, biases that arise from dropping 
observations with incomplete records may be important.27 
The missing data problem has been well studied and it has been found that procedures, 
known as “multiple imputation”, work relatively well.28 The idea of multiple imputation is to use 
the facts that you can observe about a firm in a given year to predict the data that has not been 
recorded. The predicted data is less certain than is the observed data. There is a distribution of 
possible values. Accordingly, the standard approach is to stochastically impute the missing 
values several times. In this way several data sets are created. Each data set is analyzed as if it 
were a complete data set. Then the results are aggregated in order to see how sensitive the results 
are to the imputed values. 
The results of imputing the missing values are found in column (8) headed “Impute Missing” 
in Table V.29 Imputing missing data has the effect of dramatically increasing the number of firm 
years from 180,552 to 272,537. 
Even with this large increase in data, for the set of factors that form the core model, it is 
remarkable how little change is observed. None of the conclusions about the reliable factors are 
                                                 
27 To understand why this is potentially so important consider a simple example. We let x and y be two 
independent accounting measures that are each normally distributed with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 
10. We generate 500 of each variable and then regress x on y. The intercept is 105 (S.E. = 4.6), the slope is -0.05 
(S.E. = 0.05) and the R2=0.002. This is as it should be. Next suppose that we only include observations for which 
x>100, or y>100 or both. Now the intercept is 139.9 (S.E. = 5.1) the slope is -0.37 (S.E. = 0.05) and the R2=0.12. 
Finally suppose that we require that x+y>200. Now the intercept is 159.9 (S.E. = 5.5) the slope is -0.52 (S.E. = 0.05) 
and the R2=0.27. Obviously, when there are requirements that must be satisfied in order for the data to be observed, 
regressions reflect both the underlying data and the data recording process. 
28 The missing data problem is related to, but distinct from, the familiar survivorship bias. Compustat includes 
data only on firms in year t that continue to exist long enough to file an annual financial statement for year t in year 
t+1. This leads to the well known problem of survivorship bias. Early studies such as Titman and Wessels (1988) 
examined balanced panels of data. Only firms that existed over the full time period were included. In recent years 
this practice has been replaced by the now common use of unbalanced panels of firms. We use unbalanced panel 
methods. 
29 To implement the imputation procedure, we use the program called “ice” in Stata and generate five imputed 
datasets. We use the full set of factors as the basis for the imputation. 
affected. We have done some experimentation and found, not surprisingly, that the minor factors 
are more sensitive to multiple imputation. Since we do not stress the minor factors we have not 
explored this issue systematically. 
B. Reintroducing the minor factors 
The minor factors are of interest for some purposes. There are several reasons that justify 
adding them to the core model of leverage. If a new factor materially affects the sign and 
significance of one of the core factors, then it is interesting. If a new factor accounts for 
significant additional variation that the factors leave unexplained, then it is interesting. If a new 
factor is a variable that is policy relevant then it is interesting to add it to the model for some 
purposes. 
Accordingly in Table VI, we reintroduce these factors one at a time. We consider their effect 
when added to the core factor model, to the five factors that exclude industry and to the eight 
factors that are found robust when industry is omitted.30 We do not report coefficient estimates 
on the control factors. The coefficients on the core factors are extremely stable no matter which 
of the minor factors is added back in. In these regressions, the reported t-statistics use standard 
errors corrected for clustering both by firm and by year. 
Note that if we use conventional levels of “statistically significant”, Table VI suggests that 
many of these factors are significant. This is despite the earlier evidence that these effects are 
weak. This shows that it is easy to add a factor to our list and find that “it matters empirically.” 
In essence, Table VI provides a lengthy list of such factors. Despite their significance, some 
                                                 
30 As described earlier, these eight factors include the five core factors (without the industry median leverage) 
and three additional factors (a) dummy for regulated firms (+), (b) selling, general and administrative expense to 
sales ratio (-), and (c) macro-economic growth (+). 
minor factors have signs that are unreliable. The choice of a leverage definition is important in 
several cases. These cases may reflect either lack of robustness, or cases in which a forward 
looking measure simply provides a different perspective than a backwards looking measure. 
Theoretically disentangling such cases might be interesting in future work. 
Table VI also presents cases where it matters whether one includes the industry factor or not. 
The impact of the stock market returns, uniqueness variable, and regulated variable are reversed 
depending on whether industry is included or not. The effect of stock market return on leverage 
is negative and significant when industry is included, but positive and significant when it is 
excluded. 
Several other variables are insignificant when industry median leverage is included but 
become statistically significant when it is excluded. This is important. It implies that a great deal 
of robustness checking is needed to properly establish empirical results as being reliable. 
As an example, consider the effect of investment tax credits. In Table II, it is positively 
correlated with leverage. In Table III, it is dropped at the point where it has a coefficient of -
1.692 and a t-statistic of -3.4. What is much more interesting is seen in Table VI. Depending on 
the set of factors used as controls and the definition of leverage, this factor can have either a 
positive sign or a negative sign. In the market leverage regression, the t-statistic is 3.3 when 
included with the  core factors, but it becomes -1.2 with eight control variables: five core factors 
(without industry median leverage) and three additional variables viz. dummy for regulated firm, 
selling, general and administrative expense/sales ratio and macro growth. If we measure leverage 
using book values, the coefficient is significantly negative regardless of the set of core factors 
used. 
Adding or dropping a factor that is itself minor typically has little effect. Yet there are cases 
in which one can provide “robust” evidence that a given factor has a positive sign on leverage 
and yet by using a slightly different set of control factors it can also be established that the same 
factor also has a robust negative effect on leverage. What this means is that using exactly the 
same data, but different control factors or with different definitions of leverage, different papers 
might reach different conclusions about how a particular factor relates to leverage. This is why it 
is important for the literature to make use of a standardized set of control factors, such as the 
robust factors. 
C. Caveats 
The current paper documents reliable patterns in the leverage data. We do not provide 
structural tests of the theories. That is a job for another day. To mitigate concern about 
endogeneity we use factors from the previous year, not contemporaneous factors. This does not 
resolve the endogeneity problem nor the lack of a structural model. But at least it has the merit of 
ensuring that the factors are in the firm's information set. To go further would require imposing 
extra structure and then testing whether that structure fits the data. Such studies are worth doing, 
but they are well outside the scope of the current paper. We hope that our results may be a useful 
precursor to studies that impose more structure. 
There are a number of other things that we have not studied in this paper. We have not 
allowed for alternative functional forms and general non-linearities. We have not allowed for 
general interaction effects, although some minor interaction effects can be found in Table IV. We 
have not measured underwriting costs and their impacts. We have not studied dynamic effects in 
this paper.31 We have intentionally excluded firm fixed effects. Firm fixed effects are statistically 
important. However, the interpretation is unclear. Their inclusion would not be appropriate for 
our purposes. Including them would have its largest effect on the industry median leverage 
variable. All of these are potentially interesting, and we hope to explore many of them in the 
future. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper studies publicly traded American firms over the period 1950 to 2003 to determine 
which factors have a reliable relation to market-based leverage. Starting from a large set of 
factors that have been used in previous studies, we find that a set of six factors provides a solid 
basic account of the patterns in the data: 
 Firms that compete in industries in which the median firm has high leverage tend to have 
high leverage. 
 Firms that have a high market-to-book ratio tend to have low levels of leverage. 
 Firms that have more tangible assets tend to have more leverage. 
 Firms that have more profits tend to have less leverage. 
 Larger firms (as measured by book assets) tend to have high leverage. 
 When inflation is expected to be high firms tend to have high leverage. 
In addition to these six factors, a previous version of this paper finds that an indicator 
variable indicating whether the firm pays a dividend is also reliably associated with leverage. 
Firms that pay dividends have less leverage than nonpayers. The existing capital structure 
theories have ambiguous predictions on the relation between dividend paying status and firm 
leverage. In our view, the interpretation of dividends needs further development beyond that 
contained in the literature. 
                                                 
31 These are addressed in many other papers including Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Welch (2004), 
Frank and Goyal (2004), Leary and Roberts (2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 
(2008), Huang and Ritter (2007), and Tsyplakov (2008). 
Many studies report that whatever their results are, they are robust to the use of market or 
book leverage. Given these past studies, we expected that the main factors would also be robust 
to the choice of market or book leverage. This turns out not to be correct. 
When studying book leverage, the effects of market-to-book, firm size, and expected 
inflation factors all lose the reliable impact that they have when studying market-based leverage. 
The industry median leverage, tangibility, and profitability remain reliable and statistically 
significant. 
How do we interpret this surprising finding? Recall that Barclay, Morellec, and Smith (2006) 
argue book-leverage is backwards-looking while market-leverage is forwards looking. From this 
perspective we see that the effects of the market-to-book assets ratio, firm size (as measured by 
book assets), and expected inflation are apparently operating through their ability to capture 
aspects of the firm's anticipated future. Industry median leverage, tangibility and profitability 
appear to reflect the impact of the firm's past. We believe that this distinction merits future 
attention from corporate finance theorists. 
How good an account do these major theories provide for the main patterns we see in the 
data? We study publicly traded American firms over the past half century. For these firms, the 
evidence points to weaknesses in each theory – some more damaging than others. The nature of 
the weaknesses differs. 
Market timing is frequently pointed to by advocates of behavioral finance. But market timing 
could also result from rational optimizing by managers (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2002)). Almost 
any realistic optimizing model of corporate leverage is likely to have time-varying costs and 
benefits. This will lead to time-varying optimal choices. More importantly, market timing 
provides very few refutable cross-sectional implications within this empirical framework and no 
direct explanation for the main patterns that we observe. Furthermore, the idea provides no 
natural explanation for most of the observed cross-sectional capital structure regularities 
independent of the broader tradeoff framework.32 
The pecking order theory provides an intuitively pleasing explanation for the fact that more 
profitable firms tend to have lower leverage. However, the most important single empirical 
factor is industry leverage. The pecking order does not directly predict the importance of 
industry. The roles of tangibility and firm size also do not easily and directly flow from the basic 
logic of the pecking order theory. Thus considerable theoretical development would be needed if 
a model within the basic pecking order approach is to completely account for the main robust 
evidence. 
The tradeoff theory provides accounts for many of the factors such as industry leverage, firm 
size, tangibility and market-to-book. The main empirical weakness of the tradeoff theory is 
commonly thought to be the fact that more profitable firms generally have lower leverage. In 
dynamic tradeoff models, however, leverage and profits can be negatively related. Tsyplakov 
(2008), for example, argues that when productive capacity takes time to build and is lumpy, 
firms tend to stock pile retained earnings (i.e. build up internal equity) before spending the 
money to build capacity. The process of retaining earnings would show up empirically as profits 
reducing leverage. Buying the physical capital involves spending money, which thus increases 
leverage. 
                                                 
32 Market timing does however seem to be a natural way to think about things like waves of IPOs, as in 
Loughran and Ritter (1995). 
According to the well-known statistician Box (1979) “All models are wrong, but some are 
useful.” We hope that the six core factors will provide a useful basis for further studies of 
leverage. The core factors are quite robust. The fact that the same factors have generally similar 
effects across classes of firms is particularly encouraging. It suggests that a unified theory of 
leverage might not be beyond reach. When such a theory emerges it seems fairly clear that it will 
have important elements in common with what is currently known as the tradeoff theory. It also 
seems likely that some friction such as time-to-build or transaction costs will be important. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Leverage Measures 
Total debt/market value of assets (TDM) is the ratio of total debt (Compustat item 34, debt in 
current liabilities + item 9, long-term debt) to MVA, market value of assets. MVA is the sum of 
the market value of equity (item 199, price-close × item 54, shares outstanding) + item 34, debt 
in current liabilities + item 9, long-term debt + item 10, preferred-liquidation value, - item 35, 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit. 
Total debt/assets (TDA) is the ratio of total debt (item 34, debt in current liabilities + item 9, 
long-term debt) to item 6, assets. 
Long-term debt/market value of assets (LDM) is the ratio of item 9, long term debt, to MVA, 
market value of assets. 
Long term debt/assets (LDA) is the ratio of item 9, long-term debt to item 6, assets. 
Factors 
Profitability 
Profitability - operating income before depreciation (Profit) is the ratio of Compustat item 13, 
operating income before depreciation, to item 6, assets. 
Firm size 
Log of Assets (Assets) is the log of Compustat item 6, assets deflated to 1992 dollars using the 
GDP deflator. 
Mature firms (Mature) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm has been listed 
on the Compustat database for more than 5 years. 
Growth 
Market-to-Book ratio (Mktbk) is the ratio of market value of assets (MVA) to Compustat item 
6, assets. MVA is obtained as the sum of the market value of equity (item 199, price-close × item 
54, shares outstanding) + item 34, short-term debt + item 9, long-term debt + item 10, preferred-
liquidation value, - item 35, deferred taxes and investment tax credit. 
Change in log assets (ChgAsset) is change in log of Compustat item 6, assets. 
Capital expenditure/assets (Capex) is the ratio of Compustat item 128, capital expenditure, to 
item 6, assets. 
Industry 
Median industry leverage (IndustLev) is the median of total debt to market value of assets by 
SIC code and by year. Industry is defined at the four-digit SIC code level in the main results. 
Robustness is examined by re-defining industry at the three-digit SIC level. 
Median industry growth (IndustGr) is the median of change in the log of Compustat item 6, 
assets, by SIC code and by year. 
Regulated dummy (Regultd) is a dummy variable equal to one for firms in regulated industries 
and zero otherwise. Regulated industries include railroads (SIC code 4011) through 1980, 
trucking (between 4210 and 4213) through 1980, airlines (4512) through 1978, 
telecommunications (4812 and 4813) through 1982 and gas and electric utilities (between 4900 
and 4939). 
Nature of assets 
Tangibility (Tang) is the ratio of Compustat item 8, net property, plant and equipment, to item 6, 
assets. 
RND Expense/sales (RnD) is the ratio of Compustat item 45, research & development expense, 
to item 12, sales. 
Uniqueness Dummy (Unique) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the SIC code of 
the firm is between 3400 and 4000 (firms producing computers, semiconductors, chemicals and 
allied, aircraft, guided missiles, and space vehicles and other sensitive industries), and zero 
otherwise. 
SGA Expense/Sales (SGA) is the ratio of item 189, selling, general and administration expenses, 
to item 12, sales. 
Taxes 
Top tax rate (TaxRate) is the top statutory tax rate. It was 42 percent in 1950, 51 percent in 
1951, 52 percent from 1952-1963, 50 percent in 1964, 48 percent from 1965 to 1967, 52.8 
percent from 1968 to 1969, 49.2 percent in 1970, 48 percent from 1971 to 1978, 46 percent from 
1979 to 1986, 40 percent in 1987, 34 percent from 1988 to 1992, and 35 percent from 1993 to 
2003. 
NOL carry forwards/assets (NOLCF) is the ratio of item 52, net operating loss carry forward 
to item 6, assets. 
Depreciation/assets (Depr) is the ratio of Compustat item 125, depreciation expense, to item 6, 
assets. 
Investment tax credit/assets (InvTaxCr) is the ratio of Compustat item 208, investment tax 
credit - balance sheet, to item 6, assets. 
Risk 
Variance of asset returns (StockVar) is the annual variance of asset returns that is obtained by 
unleveraging the variance of equity returns, with other asset values assumed to be equal to their 
book values. Return variance is coded as missing if CRSP has less than 100 valid daily return 
observations in a fiscal year. 
Supply-side factors 
Debt rating dummy (Rating) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if Compustat item 
280, senior debt rating, or item 320, subordinated debt rating, have a value of less than 13 (i.e., 
S&P rates the debt investment grade). Rating takes a value of zero if the debt is not rated or if it 
is rated less than investment grade. Compustat does not report data on bond ratings before 1985. 
Thus, the variable is set equal to zero for all firms prior to 1985. 
Stock market conditions 
Cumulative raw return (StockRet) is cumulative annual raw stock return obtained by 
compounding monthly returns from CRSP. 
Cumulative market returns (CrspRet) is annual CRSP Value-Weighted Index return. 
Debt market conditions 
Term spread (TermSprd) is the difference between the ten-year interest series and the one-year 
interest series. (Source: Federal Reserve files at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/.) 
Macroeconomic conditions 
Expected inflation rate (Inflation) is the expected change in the consumer price index over the 
coming year using data from the Livingston Survey available at 
http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/liv/index.html. 
Growth in profit after tax – macro (MacroProf) is differences in log of aggregate annual 
corporate profits after tax for non-financial firms. (Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.) 
Growth in GDP (MacroGr) is differences in log of real Gross Domestic Product in 1996 
dollars. (Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.) 
 
Table I: Data Description for Publicly Traded, Non-Financial U.S. companies, 1950-2003 
The leverage measures and factors (other than assets, indicator variables and macro variables) are 
winsorized at the 0.50% level in both tails of the distribution before the summary statistics are calculated. 
The cutoffs are determined for the aggregate sample. The sample period is 1950-2003. Financial firms 
and firms involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB) are excluded. The variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
Distribution 
Variable    N   Mean   SD   10th  50th   90th 
Leverage Measures 
TDM  203,211 0.28 0.26 0.00 0.22 0.67
TDA  246,187 0.29 0.35 0.00 0.24 0.59
LDM  203,211 0.20 0.21 0.00 0.13 0.52
LDA  250,785 0.20 0.22 0.00 0.14 0.46
Factors  
Profitability 
Profit  247,348 0.02 0.47 -0.19 0.12 0.25
Firm size 
Assets  251,073 4.58 2.43 1.48 4.57 7.80
Mature  272,537 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
Growth 
Mktbk  203,207 1.76 2.87 0.51 1.00 3.23
ChgAsset  228,313 0.05 0.43 -0.26 0.00 0.41
Capex  251,073 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.17
Industry 
IndustLev  18,514 0.25 0.20 0.08 0.24 0.43
IndustGr  18,223 0.02 0.15 -0.10 0.00 0.14
Regultd  272,537 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nature of Assets 
Tang  249,482 0.34 0.25 0.06 0.28 0.74
RnD  246,472 0.14 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.11
Unique  272,537 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00
SGA  246,472 0.38 1.10 0.00 0.18 0.57
Taxes 
TaxRate  54 0.45 0.07 0.35 0.48 0.52
NOLCF  190,914 0.49 2.41 0.00 0.00 0.70
Depr  251,073 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.09
Distribution 
Variable    N   Mean   SD   10th  50th   90th 
InvTaxCr  240,099 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Risk 
StockVar  160,436 0.27 0.40 0.03 0.13 0.62
Supply side factors 
Rating  272,537 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
Stock market conditions 
StockRet  169,891 0.14 0.66 -0.51 0.04 0.81
CrspRet  173,218 0.12 0.17 -0.11 0.14 0.33
Debt market conditions 
TermSprd  54 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
Macroeconomic conditions 
Inflation  54 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06
MacroProf  54 -0.02 0.17 -0.25 -0.02 0.17
MacroGr  54 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.06
Table II: Correlations between Leverage Ratios and Factors 
This table presents correlation coefficients between leverage measures and various leverage factors. The 
variables are defined in Appendix A. In square brackets below the correlation coefficients, we present a 
summary of the period-by-period correlations. The sample period from 1950 to 2003 is broken up into six 
periods -- five decades and the last period consisting of 2000-2003. A + indicates that the correlation was 
positive and significant in at least 2 out of 6 periods. A ++ indicates that the correlation was positive and 
significant in at least 4 out of 6 periods. A +++ indicates that it was significant and positive in every 
period. The -, --, and ---, are analogously defined for the negative and significant cases. A -+ indicates 
that the correlations are negative and significant in at least two out of six periods and positive and 
significant in at least two other periods. A --+ indicates that the correlations are negative and significant 
in four out of six periods and positive and significant in the other two periods. Similarly, a ++- indicates 
that the correlations are positive and significant in four out of six periods and negative and significant in 
the other two periods. Significance is defined at the 1 percent level. 
Total 
Debt/Market 
Assets  
(TDM) 
Total Debt/Book 
Assets 
(TDA) 
Long-term 
Debt/Market 
Assets 
(LDM) 
Long-term 
Debt/Book 
Assets 
(LDA) 
Profit 0.055*** -0.334*** 0.116*** -0.001 
[ -+] [---] [ -+] [ -+] 
Assets 0.204*** -0.098*** 0.311*** 0.179*** 
[+++] [--+] [+++] [+++] 
Mature 0.125*** -0.014*** 0.139*** 0.031*** 
[ ++] [ -+] [ ++] [  +] 
Mktbk -0.282*** 0.196*** -0.264*** -0.060*** 
[---] [ -+] [---] [ --] 
ChgAsset -0.144*** -0.159*** -0.076*** -0.046*** 
[ --] [--+] [ --] [--+] 
Capex -0.022*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.071*** 
[ --] [+++] [ ++] [ ++] 
IndustLev 0.436*** 0.267*** 0.426*** 0.360*** 
[+++] [+++] [+++] [+++] 
IndustGr -0.137*** -0.059*** -0.106*** -0.035*** 
[ --] [--+] [ --] [ -+] 
Regultd 0.192*** 0.069*** 0.242*** 0.171*** 
[+++] [+++] [+++] [+++] 
Tang 0.261*** 0.142*** 0.345*** 0.286*** 
[+++] [+++] [+++] [+++] 
RnD -0.127*** -0.009*** -0.116*** -0.057*** 
[---] [  -] [---] [---] 
Unique -0.106*** -0.059*** -0.138*** -0.112*** 
[---] [---] [---] [---] 
SGA -0.136*** 0.055*** -0.148*** -0.064*** 
[---] [ ++] [ --] [---] 
TaxRate 0.081*** -0.049*** 0.092*** -0.003 
Total 
Debt/Market 
Assets  
(TDM) 
Total Debt/Book 
Assets 
(TDA) 
Long-term 
Debt/Market 
Assets 
(LDM) 
Long-term 
Debt/Book 
Assets 
(LDA) 
[  -] [  -] [ -+] [  -] 
NOLCF -0.049*** 0.356*** -0.101*** 0.036*** 
[ -+] [+++] [  -] [ ++] 
Depr 0.040*** 0.231*** -0.001 0.088*** 
[ ++] [ ++] [  +] [ ++] 
InvTaxCr 0.142*** 0.025*** 0.186*** 0.089*** 
[ ++] [ ++] [ ++] [ ++] 
StockVar -0.253*** -0.144*** -0.263*** -0.193*** 
[---] [ --] [---] [---] 
Rating 0.029*** 0.002 0.064*** 0.055*** 
[  +] [  -] [  +] [  +] 
StockRet -0.180*** -0.090*** -0.114*** -0.033*** 
[---] [ --] [---] [ --] 
CrspRet -0.058*** -0.005** -0.035*** 0.011*** 
[ --] [  -] [ --] [  +] 
TermSprd -0.047*** 0.020*** -0.043*** -0.004** 
[---] [  0] [---] [  -] 
Inflation 0.187*** 0.025*** 0.170*** 0.035*** 
[ ++] [ -+] [ ++] [  +] 
MacroProf -0.009*** -0.014*** 0.001 -0.009*** 
[ --] [ --] [  -] [  -] 
MacroGr -0.062*** -0.032*** -0.042*** -0.017*** 
[ --] [ --] [ --] [  -] 
***Significant at the 0.01 level.  
**Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
  
 
 
Table III: Core Factor Selection Using Market Leverage as the Dependent Variable 
The table reports the variation in leverage explained by various factors. The factors are defined in Appendix A and are lagged by one year. 
Leverage is defined as TDM. We begin with the regression that includes all factors and report the R2 (in the cumulative R2 column) and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (in the BIC column) at the bottom of the table. The standard errors are corrected for clustering at both the firm 
level and at the year level. The coefficient estimate and the t-statistic of the factor that has performed worst (the lowest t-statistic) are also reported 
at the bottom of the table. ‘Own’ reports the R2 from simple univariate regressions of the leverage measure on this factor. We then delete the worst 
performing variable, run the regression with the remaining variables, and report the R2 and the BIC in the second to the bottom cell in the table. 
Thus, the ‘Cumulative’ reports R2 from a regression that includes the variable listed, along with all variables listed above it. We then continue in 
this manner all the way up the table. The variables are listed in the order of the amount of additional variation explained. Group Positive% reports 
the percentage of instances for which the given factor has a positive sign and is included in the minimum BIC specification in 10 equally-sized 
random sub-samples. Group Negative% reports the percentage of instances for which the given factor has a negative sign and is included in the 
minimum BIC specification in 10 equally-sized random sub-samples. The data are also run on each of the 54 years independently. These results 
are summarized in columns labeled Year Positive% and Year Negative%, which report the percentage of instances for which the given factor was 
included in the minimum BIC specification and for which the coefficient had the indicated sign. 
Table III Continued 
Factor 
Coefficient 
Estimate t-stat Own R2 
Cumulative 
R2 BIC 
Group 
Positive% 
Group 
Negative% 
Year 
Positive% 
Year 
Negative% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
IndustLev 0.8 32.7 0.2 0.19 -17288.4 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Tang 0.1 11.7 0.1 0.20 -20243.7 100.0 0.0 55.8 0.0
Mktbk 0.0 -6.6 0.1 0.23 -27101.4 0.0 100.0 0.0 82.7
SGA 0.0 -2.7 0.0 0.24 -27750.5 0.0 80.0 0.0 40.4
RnD 0.0 -1.6 0.0 0.24 -27751.8 0.0 20.0 0.0 17.3
Profit -0.1 -7.8 0.0 0.26 -32588.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Assets 0.0 6.6 0.1 0.27 -33616.5 90.0 0.0 57.7 0.0
Rating -0.1 -5.0 0.0 0.27 -34145.6 0.0 50.0 0.0 32.7
Capex -0.1 -3.6 0.0 0.28 -34478.0 0.0 40.0 9.6 25.0
Inflation 1.3 4.7 0.0 0.26 -36925.7 100.0 0.0 NA NA
NOLCF 0.0 -1.2 0.0 0.28 -32956.7 0.0 0.0 1.9 7.7
StockRet 0.0 -4.6 0.0 0.28 -31178.9 0.0 80.0 1.9 38.5
Regultd 0.1 3.7 0.0 0.29 -31275.9 0.0 0.0 21.2 0.0
StockVar 0.0 -3.5 0.1 0.29 -31176.4 0.0 30.0 0.0 32.7
InvTaxCr -1.7 -3.4 0.0 0.29 -28240.5 0.0 0.0 3.8 3.8
ChgAsset 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.29 -27990.0 10.0 0.0 23.1 7.7
Unique 0.0 -2.2 0.0 0.29 -28027.8 0.0 10.0 1.9 19.2
MacroGr 0.7 1.9 0.0 0.29 -28416.0 50.0 0.0 NA NA
TermSprd -0.7 -1.2 0.0 0.29 -28536.5 0.0 10.0 NA NA
IndustGr 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.29 -28537.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Depr 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.29 -28530.9 0.0 0.0 3.8 5.8
Mature 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.29 -28524.5 0.0 0.0 11.5 11.5
MacroProf 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.29 -28523.9 0.0 0.0 NA NA
TaxRate 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.29 -28518.5 0.0 0.0 NA NA
CrspRet 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.29 -28506.9 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0
Table IV: Do different factors matter for firms in different circumstances? 
This table presents a summary of the results from the robustness checks for various classes of firms. All factors are lagged by one year and are 
defined in Appendix A. Leverage is defined as TDM. The classes we examine include (1) dividend- and non-dividend-paying firms; (2) large and 
small firms (assets larger than the 67th percentile and smaller than the 33rd percentile in annual Compustat cross-sections), and (3) low and high 
growth firms (the market-to-book assets ratio smaller than the 33rd percentile and larger than the 67th percentile in annual Compustat cross-
sections). The columns headed “+%” and “%” are generated by running the data for each of the 54 years independently. They list the instances in 
which the particular factor was included in the minimum BIC specification and for which the regression coefficient had the indicated sign. 
Standard errors used in this exercise are corrected for two-dimensional clustering both at the firm level and the year level. 
Dividend Paying 
Firms 
Non-Dividend 
Paying Firms Large Firms Small Firms Low Growth High Growth 
+% -% +% -% +% -% +% -% +% -% +% -% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
IndustLev 100.0 0.0 84.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 92.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 98.1 0.0
Tang 55.8 0.0 50.0 0.0 44.2 0.0 38.5 0.0 50.0 0.0 26.9 1.9
Mktbk 0.0 63.5 0.0 88.0 0.0 69.2 0.0 53.8 13.5 17.3 0.0 28.8
Profit 0.0 100.0 0.0 66.0 0.0 98.1 0.0 55.8 0.0 71.2 0.0 61.5
Assets 48.1 1.9 88.0 0.0 7.7 9.6 61.5 0.0 50.0 0.0 7.7 0.0
Inflation Macroeconomic Variable  
SGA 0.0 25.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 13.5 0.0 5.8 0.0 17.3 0.0 7.7
RnD 0.0 34.6 0.0 16.0 0.0 21.2 1.9 5.8 1.9 21.2 0.0 9.6
Rating 0.0 5.8 0.0 18.0 0.0 17.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 1.9
Capex 7.7 1.9 0.0 32.0 17.3 3.8 0.0 9.6 5.8 11.5 7.7 5.8
NOLCF 0.0 0.0 4.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.0
StockRet 1.9 5.8 0.0 38.0 0.0 17.3 0.0 17.3 1.9 36.5 0.0 11.5
Regultd 30.8 0.0 4.0 0.0 9.6 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 3.8 5.8 0.0
StockVar 0.0 9.6 0.0 36.0 0.0 11.5 0.0 13.5 1.9 30.8 0.0 5.8
InvTaxCr 3.8 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0
ChgAsset 26.9 0.0 2.0 16.0 19.2 0.0 1.9 5.8 34.6 1.9 5.8 1.9
Unique 1.9 0.0 2.0 22.0 0.0 7.7 0.0 1.9 1.9 13.5 1.9 0.0
MacroGr Macroeconomic Variable 
TermSprd 
Dividend Paying 
Firms 
Non-Dividend 
Paying Firms Large Firms Small Firms Low Growth High Growth 
+% -% +% -% +% -% +% -% +% -% +% -% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
IndustGr 3.8 0.0 2.0 12.0 5.8 1.9 0.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 0.0
Depr 5.8 0.0 2.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 1.9 7.7 7.7 0.0
Mature 0.0 5.8 26.0 6.0 0.0 7.7 7.7 3.8 7.7 5.8 1.9 3.8
MacroProf Macroeconomic Variable 
TaxRate Macroeconomic Variable 
CrspRet 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.9 1.9 3.8 1.9 1.9 1.9
Table V: A core model of leverage 
This table reports estimates from regressions of leverage on the core model. The factors are defined in Appendix A and are lagged by one year. 
Leverage is defined as TDM in Panel A and as TDA in Panel B. Columns (1) to (7) report the estimated coefficients from OLS regressions with 
clustered standard errors. Column (8), titled “Impute Missing”, reports estimates based on the use of Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations 
for imputing missing values. The imputation is done by using a switching regression, an iterative multivariate regression technique. The technique 
assumes that missing observations are missing at random. The procedure is implemented using ICE in Stata. We impute 5 times. The number of 
observations, AIC, BIC and Adjusted R2 in Column (8) are averages from an analysis of 5 datasets.  
Panel A: Total Debt to Market Assets (TDM) 
All Years 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-03 
Impute 
Missing All Years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
IndustLev   0.684***  0.681*** 0.466*** 0.671***  0.715***  0.647***  0.639*** 0.665*** 0.674*** 
   (51.8) (14.2) (9.3) (27.5) (35.9) (37.7) (20.8) (54.1) (51.8) 
Tang  0.092*** -0.006  0.086***  0.061***  0.137*** 0.106***  0.134*** 0.090***  0.105*** 
   (14.8) (-0.2)   (5.0) (4.7) (13.8) (12.8) (12.0) (15.2) (17.0) 
Mktbk -0.024*** -0.039*** -0.022*** -0.058*** -0.032*** -0.022*** -0.011***  -0.022***   -0.023*** 
     (-43.3)   (-6.1)   (-9.9)     (-19.0)     (-25.1)     (-27.0)     (-21.1)   (-44.3)   (-42.7)   
Profit   -0.120*** -0.542*** -0.628*** -0.687*** -0.156*** -0.090*** -0.049***  -0.011***  -0.114*** 
     (-34.9)     (-11.9)     (-18.8)     (-22.9)     (-17.5)     (-19.3)     (-12.3)    (-37.2) (-34.9)  
Assets   0.011*** -0.002 0.001 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.009***  0.014***  0.023*** 
   (15.4) (-0.6)   (0.9) (7.8) (11.3) (11.4) (8.2) (19.6) (29.5) 
Inflation  1.328***  1.037*** 0.832*** 1.030*** 0.688*** 0.221 8.886***   1.338*** 1.586*** 
   (25.7) (10.2) (3.0) (10.8) (11.4) (0.9) (12.9) (26.9) (31.5) 
Dividend                       -0.102*** 
                            (-34.1)   
Constant   0.039***  0.234***  0.202***  0.220***  0.048*** 0.066***  -0.131***  0.025*** 0.012*** 
   (8.9) (9.6) (17.2) (16.6) (6.2) (7.8) (-8.0) (6.2) (2.7) 
AIC   -34,579.0 -5,832.0 -16,334.7 -8,588.8 -8,413.1 -11,419.5 -212.3 -36,781.0 -41111.0 
BIC   -34,508.3 -5,787.1 -16,281.1 -8,529.8 -8,352.2 -11,356.8 -155.2 -36,707.0 -41,030.2 
R2-Adjusted  0.266 0.415 0.408 0.324 0.251 0.254 0.24 0.262 0.292 
Observations 180,552 4,483 15,618 3,3542 43,834 57,313 25,762 272,537 180,552 
Table V Continued 
Panel B: Total Debt to Book Assets 
All Years 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-03 
Impute 
Missing All Years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
IndustLev 0.668*** 0.685*** 0.685*** 0.592*** 0.610*** 0.662*** 0.695*** 0.694*** 0.661*** 
(43.1) (15.3) (21.7) (27.5) (15.7) (32.0) (16.2) (48.6) (43.2) 
Tang 0.126*** 0.044* 0.088*** 0.120*** 0.150*** 0.121*** 0.146*** 0.111*** 0.136*** 
(17.5) (1.8) (6.4) (11.0) (11.9) (11.4) (8.4) (16.1) (19.1) 
Mktbk 0.002* 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.003** 0.009*** 0.002 0.002** 
(1.7) (0.0) (1.0) (-0.2) (-1.0) (-2.0) (5.4) (2.4) (2.0) 
Profit -0.252*** -0.350*** -0.546*** -0.547*** -0.257*** -0.207*** -0.233*** -0.212*** -0.250*** 
(-28.9) (-8.2) (-17.8) (-20.7) (-12.5) (-14.9) (-16.8) (-28.5) (-28.5) 
Assets 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.004*** 0.001 0.003*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 0.010*** 
(0.8) (0.5) (-1.5) (3.6) (0.5) (2.8) (-3.5) (-4.0) -11.3 
Inflation 0.052 0.699*** 1.014*** 0.108 -0.148** -1.917*** 1.215 0.063 0.230*** 
(1.1) (7.9) (4.8) (1.1) (-2.4) (-6.4) (0.8) (1.1) (4.8) 
Dividend  -0.077*** 
(-26.2) 
Constant 0.083*** 0.096*** 0.136*** 0.127*** 0.111*** 0.139*** 0.071** 0.107*** 0.064*** 
(15.4) (4.7) (11.8) (12.0) (10.2) (11.5) (2.0) (20.9) (11.9) 
AIC 55,485 -7,192 -18,311 -26,857 6,515 23,850 31,202 123,496 53,156 
BIC 55,556 -7,147 -18,257 -26,798 6,576 23,912 31,260 123,570 53,237 
R2-Adjusted 0.185 0.382 0.465 0.297 0.142 0.138 0.212 0.148 0.195 
Observations 183,962 4,537 15,652 33,908 44,650 58,088 27,127 272,537 183,962 
***Significant at the 0.01 level.  
**Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table VI: Re-introducing minor factors 
 
This table presents regression coefficients and the associated t-statistics (in parentheses) on the minor factors when included one at a time with the 
core leverage factors. The standard errors are corrected for clustering at both the firm level and at the year level. The factors are defined in 
Appendix A and are lagged by one year. Columns (1) and (4) present the estimated coefficients and t-statistics on each of the minor factors when 
included one at a time together with IndustLev, Mktbk, Tang, Profit, Assets, and Inflation. Columns (2) and (5) repeat this exercise after 
controlling for Mktbk, Tang, Profit, Assets, and Inflation. Columns (3) and (6) control for Mktbk, Tang, Inflation, Profit, MacroGr, SGA, Regultd, 
and Assets. The coefficient estimates on these core factors are suppressed in the table. 
Total Debt to Market Assets (TDM) Total Debt to Book Assets (TDA) 
Minor 
Factors 
Included 6 Core 
Factors 
Included 5 Core 
Factors w/o 
IndustLev 
Included 8 Factors 
Min BIC w/o Ind. 
Included 6 Core 
Factors 
Included 5 Core 
Factors w/o 
IndustLev 
Included 8 Factors 
Min BIC w/o Ind. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mature  0.014***  0.014***  0.010***  0.014***   0.015***  0.010***  
   (6.7)  (6.7)  (4.8)  (5.0)   (5.2)  (3.6)  
ChgAsset  -0.008***  -0.010***  0.002  -0.012***  -0.015***  -0.007**  
   (-4.4)  (-5.2)  (1.0)  (-3.5)  (-4.1)  (-2.0)  
MacroGr  0.557***  0.470***  0.286***  0.205***  
  (25.4)  (20.6)  (10.2)  (7.1)  
MacroProf  -0.009***  -0.022***  -0.053***  -0.008**  -0.019***  -0.035***  
   (-3.2)  (-7.1)  (-15.4) (-2.1)  (-5.2)  (-8.3)  
TermSprd  -0.660***  -0.547***  -0.539***  -0.227***  -0.118  -0.152**  
   (-11.2) (-8.6)  (-8.5)  (-3.1)  (-1.5)  (-2.0)  
CrspRet  -0.013***  -0.015***  -0.017***  0.013***   0.011***  0.010***  
  (-4.3)  (-4.7)  (-5.6)  (3.9)   (3.2)  (3.0)  
StockRet  -0.030***  -0.030***  -0.029***  -0.013***   -0.013***  -0.013***  
   (-29.7)  (-27.6) (-27.8) (-10.9) (-10.5) (-10.3) 
StockVar  -0.047***  -0.072***  -0.067***  -0.034***  -0.058***  -0.057***  
   (-20.4)  (-29.4)  (-27.1)  (-11.9)  (-19.5)  (-19.0)  
Rating  -0.047***  -0.032***  -0.033***  -0.004   0.011***  0.011**   
  (-10.0)  (-6.1)  (-6.8)  (-0.9)   (2.7)  (2.5)  
InvTaxCr  0.852***  2.028***  -0.374  -1.820***  -0.667***  -2.429***  
Total Debt to Market Assets (TDM) Total Debt to Book Assets (TDA) 
Minor 
Factors 
Included 6 Core 
Factors 
Included 5 Core 
Factors w/o 
IndustLev 
Included 8 Factors 
Min BIC w/o Ind. 
Included 6 Core 
Factors 
Included 5 Core 
Factors w/o 
IndustLev 
Included 8 Factors 
Min BIC w/o Ind. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   (3.3)  (7.1)  (-1.2)  (-10.6)  (-3.5)  (-12.0)  
Depr  0.073***  0.023  -0.002  0.578***   0.531***  0.442***  
  (3.3)  (1.0)  (-0.1)  (13.5)   (12.0)  (10.0)  
NOLCF  <0.001  <0.001  -0.003**  0.027***   0.027***  0.028***  
  (0.3)  (0.1)  (-2.3)  (8.9)   (8.6)  (8.1)  
TaxRate  -0.016  -0.061***  -0.115***  -0.039**   -0.083***  -0.125***   
  (-0.9)  (-3.1)  (-6.0)  (-2.3)   (-4.3)  (-6.6)  
SGA  -0.017***  -0.021***  -0.011***  -0.016***  
(-18.1)  (-21.0)  (-4.8)  (-6.5)  
RnD  -0.014***  -0.022***  -0.019***  -0.025***  -0.032***  -0.031***  
(-18.7)  (-26.7)  (-22.9)  (-13.4)  (-17.3)  (-16.3)  
Unique  -0.008**  -0.026***  -0.026***  0.007**   -0.010***  -0.012***  
  (-2.4)  (-7.1)  (-7.2)  (2.1)   (-2.8)  (-3.3)  
Regultd  0.037***  0.112***  -0.021***  0.053***  
  (5.6)  (16.5)  (-4.1)  (10.0)  
IndustGr  <0.001  -0.034***  -0.032***  0.039***  0.007  0.015  
   (0.1)  (-4.9)  (-4.4)  (3.6)  (0.6)  (1.4)  
Capex  -0.180***  -0.251***  -0.197***  -0.066***   -0.137***  -0.100***  
  (-14.1)  (-17.4)  (-13.0)  (-3.5)   (-7.0)  (-5.0)  
IndustLev  0.684***  0.660***  0.669***  0.652***  
   (51.8)  (48.5)  (43.1)  (40.9)  
***Significant at the 0.01 level.  
**Significant at the 0.05 level. 
Appendix Table I: Balance Sheet items as a fraction of total assets, 1950-2003 
The table presents the median balance sheet items as a fraction of total assets for the period from 1950-2003. The data are from Compustat. 
Financial firms and firms involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB) are excluded. 
 1950-59   1960-69   1970-79   1980-89   1990-99   2000-03 
N  7,708 22,782 46,101 60,763 80,411 33,308
Assets           
Cash and short-term investments (#1)  0.144 0.077 0.054 0.059 0.069 0.084
+ Receivables - total (#2)  0.136 0.181 0.197 0.173 0.150 0.113
+ Inventories - total (#3)  0.257 0.257 0.234 0.147 0.082 0.039
+ Current assets - other (#68)  0.005 0.008 0.012 0.013 0.020 0.023
= Current assets - Total (#4)  0.619 0.587 0.590 0.562 0.533 0.478
+ Net property, plant and equipment - total (#8)  0.327 0.326 0.312 0.305 0.245 0.214
+ Investments and advances - equity method (#31)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
+ Investment and advances - other (#32)  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
+ Intangibles (#33)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.033
+ Assets - other (#69)  0.008 0.011 0.012 0.016 0.026 0.027
= Total assets (#6)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Liabilities and shareholders equity           
+ Debt in current liabilities (#34)  0.008 0.028 0.044 0.035 0.025 0.019
+ Accounts payable (#70)    .   .  0.087 0.082 0.077 0.070
+ Income taxes payable (#71)    . .  0.012 0.002 0.000 0.000
+ Current liabilities - other (#72)    . .  0.057 0.067 0.076 0.078
= Current liabilities - total (#5)  0.213 0.212 0.250 0.248 0.237 0.230
+ Long-term debt - total (#9)  0.129 0.152 0.180 0.156 0.116 0.095
+ Liabilities - other (#75)  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.008
+ Deferred taxes and ITC (#35)  0.000 0.000 0.009 0.004 0.000 0.000
+ Minority interest (#38)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 1950-59   1960-69   1970-79   1980-89   1990-99   2000-03 
= Total liabilities (#181)  0.359 0.442 0.526 0.551 0.534 0.535
+ Preferred stock - carrying value (#130)    . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
+ Common equity - total (#60)    . 0.522 0.465 0.439 0.446 0.447
= Stockholders equity - total (#216)   . 0.530 0.473 0.449 0.466 0.466
= Total liabilities and SE (#6)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
  
 Appendix Table II: Statement of cash flow items as fraction of end-of-year assets, 1950-2003 
The table presents the median cash flow statement items as a fraction of end-of-year total assets for the period from 1950 to 2003. The data are 
from Compustat. Financial firms and firms involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB) are excluded. For years up to and including 
1985, Compustat format codes 1, 2, and 3 are used. Starting in year 1990, format code 7 is used. The variables are winsorized at the 0.50% level in 
both tales of the distribution. We recode certain cash flow items as zero if they were either missing or combined with other data items (for details, 
see Table 8 of Frank and Goyal (2003)). 
Median statement of cash flow item as a fraction of end-of-year assets 
 1950-59   1960-69   1970-79   1980-89   1990-99   2000-03 
N  7,708 22,782 46,101 60,763 80,411 33,308
Income        
+ Sales(#12)  1.292 1.349 1.375 1.131 0.992 0.798
- Cost of goods sold (#41)  0.981 0.931 0.948 0.739 0.624 0.505
- Selling, general and admin. expenses (#189)  0.090 0.178 0.222 0.227 0.229 0.213
= Operating income before depreciation (#13)  0.182 0.149 0.141 0.112 0.100 0.072
- Depreciation (#14)  0.030 0.034 0.033 0.039 0.042 0.045
= Operating income after depreciations (#14)  0.141 0.110 0.101 0.070 0.055 0.026
- Interest expense (#15)  0.006 0.011 0.021 0.026 0.018 0.015
+ Non-operating income and special items (# 61+#17)  0.005 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.001
= Pre tax income (#170)  0.131 0.103 0.086 0.052 0.031 -0.001
- Income taxes - total (#16)  0.063 0.046 0.036 0.016 0.007 0.002
- Minority interests (#49)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
= Income before extraordinary items (#18)  0.065 0.057 0.049 0.033 0.020 -0.003
- Dividend preferred (#19)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
+ Common stock equivalents - savings (#191)  . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
+ Extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#48)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Net Income (#172)  0.071 0.059 0.051 0.036 0.020 -0.005
= Income before extraordinary items (#123)  . .  0.050 0.033 0.020 -0.003
+ Depreciation and amortization (#125)  . .  0.032 0.040 0.045 0.048
Median statement of cash flow item as a fraction of end-of-year assets 
 1950-59   1960-69   1970-79   1980-89   1990-99   2000-03 
+ Other funds from operations† (#124+125+106+213+217)  . .  0.002 0.004 0.005 0.012
= Funds from operations - Total (#110)  . .  0.098 0.083 0.072 0.052
+ Accounts receivable dec. (inc.) (#302)  . .  .  . -0.006 0.000
+ Inventory dec. (inc.) (#303)  . .  .   . 0.000 0.000
+ Accounts payable and accr liabilities - inc. (dec.) (#304)  . .  .   . 0.000 0.000
+ Income taxes - accrued - inc. (dec.) (#305)  . .  .   . 0.000 0.000
+ Asset and liabilities other (net change) (#307) . .  .   . 0.000 0.000
= Operating activities - net cash flow (#308)  . .  .   . 0.051 0.044
- Increase in investment (#313)  . .  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
+ Sale of investment (#109)  . .  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- Capital expenditure (#128)  0.041 0.042 0.056 0.058 0.047 0.034
+ Sale of property, plant and eqpt. (#107)  . .  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- Acquisitions (#129)  . .  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
+ ST inv. change and inv act-other (#309+310)  . .  .   . 0.000 0.000
= Investing activities - net cash flow (#311)  . .  .  . -0.069 -0.049
Financing Activities        
+ Sale of common and preferred stock (#108)  . .  0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004
- Purchase of common and pfd. stock (#115)  . .  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- Cash dividends (#127)  . .  0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
+ Long-term debt - issuance (#111)  . .  0.014 0.013 0.008 0.000
- Long-term debt - reduction (#114)  . .  0.014 0.018 0.017 0.013
+ Changes in current debt (#301)  . .  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
+ Financing activities - other (#312)  . .  .   . 0.000 0.000
= Financing activities - net cash flow (#313)  . .  . 0.001 0.015 0.006
+ Exchange rate effect (#314)  . .  .   . 0.000 0.000
= Cash and cash eqvt inc. (dec.) (#274)  . .  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Sources of funds other (#218)  . .  0.001 0.001   .   . 
Uses of funds - other (#219)  . .  0.002 0.004   .   . 
Median statement of cash flow item as a fraction of end-of-year assets 
 1950-59   1960-69   1970-79   1980-89   1990-99   2000-03 
Working capital change other (#236)  . .  0.019 0.005   .   . 
† Other funds from operation = Extraordinary items + Deferred taxes + Equity in net loss + Loss (gain) on sale of PPE and Investments + Funds 
from operations – other.  
  
 
Appendix Table III: Core Factor Selection – Without Industry Variables 
The table reports the variation in leverage explained by various factors. The factors are defined in Appendix A and are lagged by one year. This 
table excludes industry median leverage (IndustLev) and the industry median growth (IndustGr) from consideration. Leverage is defined as TDM. 
We begin with the regression that includes all factors and report the R2 (in the cumulative R2 column) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (in 
the BIC column) at the bottom of the table. The coefficient estimate and the t-statistic of the factor that has performed worst (the lowest t-statistic) 
are also reported at the bottom of the table. The standard errors are clustered at both the firm level and at the year level. ‘Own’ reports the R2 from 
simple univariate regressions of leverage measure on this factor. We then delete the worst performing variable, run the regression with the 
remaining variables, and report the R2 and the BIC in the second to the bottom cell in the table. Thus, the ‘Cumulative’ reports R2 from a 
regression that includes the variable listed, along with all variables listed above it. We then continue in this manner all the way up the table. The 
variables are listed in the order of the amount of additional variation explained. Group Positive% reports the percentage of instances for which the 
given factor has a positive sign and is included in the minimum BIC specification in 10 equally-sized random sub-samples. Group Negative% 
reports the percentage of instances for which the given factor has a negative sign and is included in the minimum BIC specification in 10 equally-
sized random sub-samples. The data are also run on each of the 54 years independently. Year Positive% and Year Negative% report the percentage 
of instances for which the given factor was included in the minimum BIC specification and for which the coefficient had the indicated sign. 
  
Appendix Table III Continued. 
Factor 
Coefficient 
Estimate t-stat Own R2
Cumulative 
R2 BIC
Group 
Positive%
Group 
Negative%
Year 
Positive%
Year 
Negative%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mktbk -0.026 44.6 0.07 0.07 8112.8 0.0 100.0 0.0 84.6
Tang 0.231 34.8 0.06 0.12 -1391.0 100.0 0.0 71.2 0.0
Inflation 1.794 32.3 0.03 0.14 -5401.8 100.0 0.0 NA NA
StockVar -0.064 25.6 0.05 0.18 -12739.6 0.0 100.0 0.0 38.5
Profit -0.142 26.7 0.00 0.19 -15917.9 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
RnD -0.022 19.8 0.02 0.20 -17086.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 42.3
MacroGr 0.421 17.3 0.00 0.20 -17256.1 70.0 0.0 NA NA
StockRet -0.019 16.4 0.02 0.20 -17568.0 0.0 100.0 3.8 34.6
Capex -0.261 15.3 0.00 0.21 -18409.2 0.0 80.0 21.2 34.6
ChgAsset 0.034 14.2 0.01 0.21 -18698.1 70.0 0.0 38.5 5.8
SGA -0.026 15.0 0.02 0.22 -19521.4 0.0 100.0 0.0 53.8
TermSprd -0.851 12.3 0.00 0.22 -19738.5 0.0 10.0 NA NA
NOLCF -0.017 8.2 0.00 0.21 -19031.8 0.0 20.0 1.9 7.7
Regultd 0.121 7.7 0.03 0.21 -19416.9 100.0 0.0 59.6 0.0
Assets 0.007 6.8 0.05 0.21 -19746.0 100.0 0.0 55.8 0.0
Unique -0.026 6.4 0.01 0.22 -20026.2 0.0 80.0 0.0 42.3
Rating -0.035 6.3 0.00 0.22 -20143.4 0.0 80.0 0.0 32.7
MacroProf -0.023 5.1 0.00 0.22 -20157.1 0.0 30.0 NA NA
TaxRate -0.152 6.0 0.01 0.22 -20301.8 0.0 30.0 NA NA
InvTaxCr -1.794 3.4 0.02 0.22 -18043.9 NA NA 3.8 1.9
CrspRet -0.011 2.9 0.00 0.22 -18038.8 NA NA 9.6 0.0
Depr -0.069 1.8 0.00 0.22 -18040.8 NA NA 5.8 7.7
Mature -0.002 0.5 0.02 0.22 -18029.9 NA NA 11.5 13.5
 
